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Hungry animals are influenced by a multitude of different factors when foraging for
sustenance. Much of the work on animal foraging has focused on factors relating to the
amount of time and energy animals expend searching for and harvesting foods. Models
that emphasize such factors have been invaluable in determining when it is beneficial
for an animal to search for pastures new. When foraging, however, animals also have
to determine how to direct their search. For what food should they forage? There is no
point searching for more of a particular food when you are sated from eating it. Here
we review work in macaques and humans that has sought to reveal the neural circuits
critical for determining the subjective value of different foods and associated objects in our
environment and tracking this value over time. There is mounting evidence that a network
composed of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), amygdala, and medial thalamus is critical for
linking objects in the environment with food value and adjusting those valuations in real
time based on current biological needs. Studies using temporary inactivation methods
have revealed that the amygdala and OFC play distinct yet complementary roles in this
valuation process. Such a network for determining the subjective value of different foods
and, by extension, associated objects, must interact with systems that determine where
and for how long to forage. Only by efficiently incorporating these two factors into their
decisions will animals be able to achieve maximal fitness.
Keywords: orbitofrontal cortex, macaque, reward, reinforcer devaluation, selective satiation, prefrontal cortex,
anthropoid primates, amygdala
INTRODUCTION
Animal learning theorists developed the selective satiation pro-
cedure to explore the behavioral effects of devaluing reinforcers
(Colwill and Rescorla, 1985). Their purpose was to alter the
value of what they call goals: the resources that animals strive
to obtain in order to fulfill biological needs, such as foods, flu-
ids, warmth, and other outcomes of behavior that often go by
the term reinforcement or reward. By using the simple proce-
dure of allowing an animal to consume one of two potential
food rewards to satiety, the experimenter could manipulate the
value of that reinforcer. Obviously, as an animal consumes one
kind of food to satiety, and afterwards for a period of time, the
value of that food decreases and animals will have less motiva-
tion to perform actions that will produce that “goal” or outcome.
This tendency of an animal to avoid behaviors that produce a
recently consumed resource in favor of some alternative is called
a devaluation effect. With this laboratory procedure, researchers
could classify an animal’s behavior as “goal-directed,” meaning
that the animal’s choice depended on the behavioral outcome
predicted to follow that choice, or, as a “habit,” meaning that
the animal’s choice did not depend on a predicted outcome.
Other laboratory procedures, such as contingency degradation,
serve the same ends (Hammond, 1980; Balleine and Dickinson,
1998).
Although these experimental procedures could hardly be more
divorced from foraging behavior under natural conditions, their
relevance should be immediately apparent. As animals forage in
the wild, they need to make a multitude of decisions: about where
to forage, for how long to forage, and about what items to expend
energy to obtain in their immediate vicinity or at some more
distant location. This applies to both the resources needed for
nutrition and hydration, as well as others such as warmth, safety
from predation, and procreation. Resources are not, however, sta-
ble over time in their abundance. A foraging animal has to take
into account the rate of diminishing returns as it continues to for-
age, moving to a different location when the current rate of return
drops. Animals therefore have to balance the energy expended for-
aging for food against the returns from doing so; such a problem
is well-explained by the marginal value theorem (Charnov, 1976).
Animals also must take into account their current state in order
to make adaptive foraging decisions. There is no advantage, for
example, in expending energy and risking predation in order to
obtain more of a food when in a fully sated state.
Foraging, broadly defined, has many elements. First, animals
have motivations and drives, that when fulfilled, satisfy their
energetic or biological needs. For example, animals have hunger
when undernourished. With a drive state in place, animals need
to: (1) search for resources taking into account the time and
energy needed for such a search; (2) identify resources, usually
through vision, taste or smell; (3) predict the value of the available
resources; and (4) select from among them. Finally, the animal
consumes the resource. Between the drive state and consump-
tion, then, least four steps can be considered separately. Here we
consider two of them—valuation and selection—functions that
are also relevant to understanding the neural bases of value-based
decision making.
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In this article, we will summarize two lines of investigation
concerning resource valuation and selection in monkeys, with
a focus on the effect of reinforcement devaluation. The first
concerns what neural substrates and what kinds of information
processing underlie devaluation effects in monkeys; the sec-
ond concerns when devaluation occurs. Before addressing these
topics, however, we briefly mention an advantage in studying
resource devaluation in Old World monkeys.
We study macaquemonkeys, in part, because of their relatively
close evolutionary relationship with humans. Nearly all animals
forage, and all mammals certainly do. Despite the complexities of
the urban jungle a trip to the market for a human is but a pale
reflection of natural foraging behavior. Some people hunt, fish,
and gather wild plant foods, but few people have depended on
such foraging since the agricultural revolution of the Neolithic
era. Modern people, however, descend from early humans, who
were hunter-gatherers. So foraging is in our evolutionary history,
and some of the mechanisms that subserved foraging decisions
in our human ancestors were inherited from more distant ones.
Figure 1 shows the evolutionary relationships most pertinent to
the devaluation literature. According to the most recent mor-
phological and molecular evidence (O’Leary et al., 2013), the
lineages that eventually produced modern rodents and primates
diverged nearly 65 million years ago, at about the same time as
the extinction of dinosaurs. The evidence from comparative neu-
roanatomy shows that a key cortical region, consisting of granular
and dysgranular parts of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), first
emerged in early primates (Preuss and Goldman-Rakic, 1991).
All primates, including Old World monkeys and humans, share
this region through inheritance from those common ancestors
(Figure 1). As the evidence reviewed in the next two sections indi-
cates, the OFC, together with subcortical structures, subserves
resource valuation in macaque monkeys. If we are to understand
the mechanisms of resource valuation in humans—an endeavor
roughly corresponding to the field called neuroeconomics—Old
World monkeys provide a more closely related starting point than
other common laboratory animals.
WHAT STRUCTURES, WHAT INFORMATION SUBSERVE
REINFORCER DEVALUATION?
Many behavioral tasks have been used as models of foraging
behavior in macaques. For example, tasks have assessed the abil-
ity to take into account delayed (Hayden and Platt, 2007; Kim
et al., 2008), effortful (Walton et al., 2006) or probabilistic out-
comes (Amiez et al., 2006; Kennerley et al., 2006; Rudebeck
et al., 2008), to track changes in reward probability or amount
over time (Sugrue et al., 2004; Yang and Shadlen, 2007; Pearson
et al., 2009; Noonan et al., 2010; Walton et al., 2010), to inte-
grate costs and benefits (Roesch andOlson, 2004; Kennerley et al.,
2009; Seo and Lee, 2009; Amemori and Graybiel, 2012), to switch
away from simulated patches of resources that decline over time
(Agetsuma, 1999; Hayden et al., 2011), and so on. All these tasks
have increased our understanding of brain mechanisms that may
have arisen to guide foraging decisions. In this review we consider
findings from experimental studies that manipulate satiety as a
way to alter—typically to lower—the value of food.
There are several reasons to consider studies that alter the state
of satiety, and to consider them in isolation. First, varying the
level of satiety provides a window on how value is represented,
updated and used to guide foraging decisions. Second, although
object-reward associations are a common feature of laboratory-
based foraging tasks, recent evidence indicates that different types
of object-reward associations are mediated by different sets of
brain circuits. For example, in macaques, different brain struc-
tures support stimulus-reward association as measured by linking
objects with reward contingency vs. linking objects with food
value (Rudebeck and Murray, 2011). Third, satiety is an indepen-
dent variable that can be measured in its own right. Foods used
FIGURE 1 | A cladogram of primates and rodents on a linear time scale. The black bars show innovations of selected lineages. Adapted from Passingham
and Wise (2012) and O’Leary et al. (2013).
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in an experiment can be controlled in terms of weight, flavor,
caloric content, etc. In addition, experimenters can control the
animal’s motivation for a particular food, by feeding an animal
only that type of food in a selective satiation procedure, or gen-
erally, by feeding daily rations. As indicated earlier, in this review
we focus on studies using sensory-specific satiety as a means of
manipulating food value. Studies employing selective satiety typi-
cally isolate the valuation and selection steps of foraging decisions
from other factors such as navigation and memory for choice
history. Although these latter functions are indeed essential fea-
tures of naturalistic foraging, a simplified method for evaluating
foraging decisions will facilitate experimental investigation of the
underlying neural substrates.
DECISIONS AMONG OBJECTS
Many of the studies we review have relied on the devaluation test
developed for macaques (Malkova et al., 1997). The devaluation
test is often carried out in two stages: training and test. In the
training phase monkeys are familiarized with a large number of
objects and their associated food rewards. To achieve this, mon-
keys learn 60 discrimination problems concurrently. Just as in
standard discrimination learning problems, on each trial, a pair
of objects consisting of one S+ (baited) and one S− (unbaited)
is presented for choice. Unlike the standard procedure, how-
ever, half of the S+ objects are rewarded with one kind of food,
designated food 1, and half are rewarded with a different food,
designated food 2. Through trial and error, monkeys learn to
choose the S+ objects to obtain the food reward hidden under-
neath. In the test phase, which consists of a series of probe tests,
only the S+ objects are used; now, for the first time, monkeys are
offered the choice between food-1 and food-2 associated objects.
Importantly, in the test phase, novel combinations of objects
are used on each trial. There is no “wrong” answer; each object
overlies the food with which it was associated in the training
phase.
Three different conditions are employed in the test phase. One
condition serves to measure baseline choices of food-1 and food-
2 associated objects. Monkeys are simply allowed to choose and
displace objects to obtain the food reward hidden underneath. A
second condition involves probe tests conducted after prefeed-
ing (selective satiation) with food 1, and yet a third condition
involves probe tests conducted after prefeeding with food 2. In
theory, prefeeding serves to temporarily devalue the food. Thus,
the probe tests conducted after feeding to satiety reveal the ability
of monkeys to link objects with current, updated food value. A
critical element of the probe tests is that choices are made with-
out any additional opportunity to learn about the object–food
value associations; optimal choices can only occur if monkeys
automatically link objects with the new food value, and use that
information to guide choices.
After being sated on one food, intact monkeys spontaneously
shift their choices away from the objects overlying the devalued
food in favor of objects overlying the higher valued (non-sated)
food; in other words, they show robust devaluation effects. This
can be quantified by calculating a “difference score,” which reflects
the extent to which monkey’s object choices on the probe tests
conducted after prefeeding differ from the baseline condition
(no prefeeding). Importantly, the devaluation effects reveal that
monkeys care about the value of the foods that result from their
object choices.
Although the task used in monkeys is based on devalua-
tion paradigms first developed and used with rats (Colwill and
Rescorla, 1985; Balleine et al., 1994; Hatfield et al., 1996), several
changes were made to make the task better suited to macaques.
First and foremost, monkeys were required to select objects, on
the basis of vision, and to displace those objects to obtain food
reward hidden underneath, behaviors that emerge with little or
no training. Thus, in experiments with monkeys, object choices
replace the food cup approach and lever press responses typically
used with rats. A second change relates to how the probe tests are
administered. If food reward is provided during the probe test,
which is meant to assess animals’ expectancy of reward value, it
may lead to relearning of cue or action-value associations, thereby
making the test less sensitive. Accordingly, in tasks with rodents,
probes tests are typically carried out under extinction, i.e., in
the absence of food reward. By contrast, the tests that assessed
monkeys’ abilities to link objects with food value were not con-
ducted in extinction. To prevent cue-value learning, however, and
to maximize the number of trials per test, the probe tests in mon-
keys used different pairs of objects on each trial. If within-trial
learning about particular objects occurred, it could not aid the
monkeys on subsequent trials. In support of this supposition, per-
formance of lesion groups tends to be stable across test sessions
(Izquierdo and Murray, 2010).
Using the object-based task described above, several studies in
monkeys have investigated the neural bases of reinforcer devalu-
ation effects. In the following sections we summarize the results
from such studies and explore their implications.
Amygdala
Studies examining the effects of excitotoxic amygdala lesions
have revealed that the macaque amygdala is an essential part of
the circuit underlying devaluation effects (Malkova et al., 1997;
Izquierdo and Murray, 2007; Machado and Bachevalier, 2007).
In Figure 2, the higher the difference score the greater the sensi-
tivity to reinforcer devaluation. For example, a difference score
of 20 indicates that monkeys shifted their choices toward the
object covering the high value (non-sated) food on 67% of tri-
als (20 out of a possible 30). Monkeys with selective, bilateral
lesions of the amygdala fail to choose objects appropriately after
changes in food value. As shown in Figure 2, left panel, relative
to controls, monkeys with amygdala lesions exhibit a significantly
lower tendency to choose objects overlying the high value (non-
sated) food, and this deficit is long lasting (Izquierdo andMurray,
2007).
The results of additional tests have helped illuminate the
nature of the impairment. First, because monkeys with amyg-
dala lesions learn visual discrimination problems at a normal
rate (Malkova et al., 1997; Izquierdo and Murray, 2007; Machado
and Bachevalier, 2007), we can rule out global changes in visual
perception as a cause for the impairment. In addition, because
monkeys with amygdala lesions have intact satiety mechanisms
and because the effect of satiety transfers from the home cage to
the test apparatus, we can conclude that the impairment does not
www.frontiersin.org June 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 112 | 3
Murray and Rudebeck Updating resource valuations
FIGURE 2 | Devaluation effects for object–outcome associations.
Summary of the scores of several groups of monkeys studied using the
devaluation task. The scores for each group are reflected in a single bar; a
higher score indicates greater sensitivity to changes in food value. Intact
monkeys avoid choosing objects associated with a devalued food, as
indicated by the high difference scores obtained by the unoperated control
group. In the left panel, monkeys with bilateral lesions of either OFC or the
amygdala continue to choose much like they had before the selective
satiation procedure, as reflected in the low difference scores. In addition,
monkeys with a surgical disconnection that prevents the intrahemispheric
interaction of the amygdala and OFC cannot efficiently link objects with the
current value of a food reward. Although the operated groups were
subjects in different studies, all groups were tested in a similar fashion and
had similar experimental histories. In the right panel, scores of groups with
lesions in different sectors of prefrontal cortex are provided. ∗p < 0.05.
Data in left panel are from Baxter et al. (2000), Izquierdo et al. (2004), and
Izquierdo and Murray (2007). Data in the right panel are from Baxter et al.
(2008, 2009). Modified from Murray and Wise (2010). Abbreviations:
Control, unoperated control monkeys; Amygdala, monkeys with bilateral
excitotoxic amygdala lesions; OFC, monkeys with bilateral aspiration lesions
of the orbital prefrontal cortex; OFC × Amygdala, monkeys with surgical
crossed disconnection of the amygdala and OFC; dorsolateral PF, monkeys
with bilateral aspiration lesions of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; ventral
PF, monkeys with bilateral aspiration lesions of the ventral prefrontal cortex.
result from altered satiety mechanisms or from an inability to dis-
criminate foods. Importantly, when considering choices among
palatable foods, there is little or no evidence that monkeys with
amygdala damage have altered food preferences (Aggleton and
Passingham, 1981; Murray et al., 1996; Izquierdo and Murray,
2007; Machado and Bachevalier, 2007; cf. Agustín-Pavón et al.,
2011) or altered motivation to work for food (Baxter et al., 2000).
Indeed in test sessions not preceded by satiation monkeys with
amygdala lesions continue to make object choices in line with
their subjective preferences. Thus, it appears that the disruption
of devaluation effects after amygdala lesions is specifically due to
a failure to link objects with the updated value of the food reward
or, alternatively, a difficulty in using this information to guide
object choices.
OFC
Figure 2 shows that, like monkeys with bilateral amygdala lesions,
monkeys with bilateral aspiration lesions of the OFC exhibit
significantly reduced devaluation effects (Izquierdo et al., 2004;
Machado and Bachevalier, 2007; Baxter et al., 2009). The left
panel of Figure 2 shows results from monkeys that were tested
in a manual test apparatus [group OFC; Izquierdo et al. (2004)],
whereas the right panel shows results from monkeys that were
tested in an automated apparatus [group OFC; Baxter et al.
(2009)]. Comparable results were obtained across studies; in each
case, monkeys with aspiration lesions of OFC were insensitive to
changes in food value. As was the case for the amygdala, low level
accounts for the impairment are extremely unlikely; explanations
of the impairment after OFC lesions in terms of alterations in
visual perceptual processes, food preferences, and willingness to
work for food rewards can be ruled out (Izquierdo et al., 2004).
The OFC in macaques has been found to consist of over a
dozen cytoarchitectonic fields (Carmichael and Price, 1994) that,
based on patterns of anatomical connections, have been grouped
into two distinct networks (Carmichael and Price, 1996; Saleem
et al., 2008). Within OFC, lateral areas correspond to a “sensory
network” and more medial areas correspond to a “visceromotor
network.”
Given these putative networks, investigators have studied
whether there is evidence for dissociation of function. Relevant
to the present discussion, it has been found that the lateral part
of OFC corresponding to areas 11 and 13, but not the medial
part of OFC corresponding to areas 14 and 10m, is essential for
devaluation effects (Rudebeck and Murray, 2011). Notably, the
impairment after lesions restricted to areas 11 and 13 was found
using selective, excitotoxic lesions, confirming that cell loss in this
area yields the behavioral impairment. In addition, the magni-
tude of the impairment matched that seen after aspiration lesions
of the whole OFC (Izquierdo et al., 2004). Taken together, these
findings suggest that damage to areas 11 and 13 is responsible for
the entire effect.
Medial MD thalamus
The medial or magnocellular division of the mediodorsal nucleus
of the thalamus (MD) is heavily interconnected with both the
OFC and the amygdala in macaques (Porrino et al., 1981;
Goldman-Rakic and Porrino, 1985). Accordingly, this region’s
contribution to value-based decision making is of interest.
Mitchell and colleagues found that bilateral lesions of the medial
portion of MD disrupted devaluation effects (Mitchell et al.,
2007). Thus, medial MD thalamus is a part of the circuitry
contributing to adaptive choices after changes in food value.
The pattern of connections of the medial MD thalamus raises
the possibility that it contributes more to value-based decision
making than currently appreciated. There are at least three aspects
of its connectivity that point to a significant contribution. First,
the medial MD thalamus is not only reciprocally connected with
OFC, but at least some of the projections cross to the other
hemisphere (Preuss and Goldman-Rakic, 1987). Second, there
are fairly widespread projections from medial MD thalamus to
the frontal cortex (Ray and Price, 1993). For example, thala-
mocortical projections arising in medial MD reach dorsal and
ventral sectors of lateral prefrontal cortex in addition to medial
and orbital frontal regions. Third, unlike the sensory relay nuclei
of the thalamus, medial MD receives inputs from several parts
of the forebrain (e.g., amygdala, entorhinal cortex, and perirhi-
nal cortex) that project directly to the frontal cortex (Russchen
et al., 1987; Ray and Price, 1993). Moreover, medial MD receives
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projections from parts of the basal forebrain, specifically sub-
stantia innominata and ventral pallidum (Russchen et al., 1987).
These structures have enigmatic functions, but there is evidence
suggesting that they contribute to value-based decision making
(Tachibana and Hikosaka, 2012). Thus, several forebrain struc-
tures, including basal forebrain, amygdala and ento- and perirhi-
nal cortex, project to medial MD and might—via thalamocortical
projections arising in medial MD—influence prefrontal cortex
function.
Amygdala, OFC, thalamic interactions
A few studies have considered whether a given set of structures
needs to interact in guiding value-based decision making, as
assessed by the devaluation task. In one study, monkeys received
a unilateral lesion of the amygdala in one hemisphere and a uni-
lateral lesion of the OFC in the other hemisphere, together with
section of the forebrain commissures. The OFC and amygdala
are reciprocally interconnected (Carmichael and Price, 1995a;
Ghashghaei et al., 2007) and this surgical preparation (a so-called
disconnection surgery) prevents the functional interaction of the
amygdala and OFC. Monkeys with the amygdala-OFC surgical
disconnection were tested on the devaluation task, and found to
be impaired (Baxter et al., 2000). In addition, Izquierdo and col-
leagues (2010) tested whether the medial MD thalamus needs
to functionally interact with other brain regions in mediating
devaluation effects. In their experiment, monkeys with unilateral
lesions of the amygdala andOFC in one hemisphere received exci-
totoxic lesions of medial MD thalamus or nucleus accumbens in
the other hemisphere. Like MD, the nucleus accumbens—a part
of the ventral striatum—is interconnected with both the OFC and
amygdala (Yeterian and Van Hoesen, 1978; Russchen et al., 1985;
Haber et al., 2006). Using this crossed disconnection design, it
was found that medial MD thalamus but not nucleus accumbens
was an essential part of the circuitry allowing monkeys to make
adaptive responses to changes in food value. Thus, in normal cir-
cumstances, the amygdala, medial MD thalamus and OFC work
together in guiding choices based on the current biological value
of different foods.
Non-essential structures
Several brain regions are not essential for devaluation effects in
monkeys, at least not as assessed using the object-based task
described above. Selective lesions of either the hippocampal
formation or the perirhinal cortex fail to disrupt devaluation
effects (Machado and Bachevalier, 2007; Chudasama et al., 2008).
Because these structures are adjacent to the amygdala, the neg-
ative results indicate that the behavioral effects of amygdala
damage are unlikely to be due to inadvertent damage to regions
outside the amygdala, and reinforce the notion that, within the
temporal lobe, only the amygdala is essential for mediating deval-
uation effects. Regions of prefrontal cortex outside the OFC have
also been examined for their contributions to devaluation effects.
Neither the ventral prefrontal cortex, situated just lateral to the
OFC, nor the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex are essential for deval-
uation effects (Baxter et al., 2008, 2009). Likewise, the anterior
cingulate cortex (area 24), situated on the medial surface of the
hemisphere and which is also interconnected with the amygdala
(Van Hoesen et al., 1993), is not essential for devaluation effects
(Chudasama et al., 2012). Finally, as indicated earlier, only the
lateral portion of OFC, the part corresponding to the “sensory,”
as opposed to the medial OFC “visceromotor” network, of Price
and colleagues, is essential for devaluation effects (Rudebeck and
Murray, 2011).
Summary of object-outcome devaluation studies
The devaluation task is a tool that permits insight into the com-
ponents of value-based decision making; it interrogates monkeys’
abilities to link objects with particular properties of food rewards,
including not only their sensory properties but also their value.
In a series of probe trials, monkeys report on their estimation of
the value of expected outcomes of their object choices. A sub-
stantial number of studies now implicate a circuit including the
lateral orbital cortex areas 11 and 13, basolateral amygdala, and
medial, magnocellular MD thalamus in helping monkeys make
adaptive choices. These structures are needed when monkeys are
required to make visually guided object choices on the basis of
subjective value associated with a specific food. Under condi-
tions of stable object-value associations, these structures are not
needed to make appropriate choices, presumably because “value”
can be processed, represented, and stored in many places in the
brain. The role of these structures in adaptive valuation of specific
outcomes may be related to model-based reinforcement learning
mechanisms (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Work in rats has shown
that the OFC is critical for model-based, as opposed to model-
free, reinforcement learning (Takahashi et al., 2009; McDannald
et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2012).
Despite advances in identifying this network of areas, one
outstanding question is what structures interact with the OFC,
amygdala and MD to allow the updating of food value. Deficits
following OFC or amygdala lesions only affect the choice of
objects or actions associated with food rewards, not the appre-
ciation, discrimination, or selection of food rewards themselves
(Izquierdo et al., 2004; Izquierdo and Murray, 2007). It is known
that parts of the hypothalamus inmacaques are involved in satiety
mechanisms (Rolls et al., 1986) but it is unclear how such parts of
the brain interact with OFC and amygdala to achieve the updat-
ing of object value. Expanding our understanding of how these
areas interact during feeding and satiety in macaques will be a
rich avenue for future research.
DECISIONS AMONG ACTIONS
The foregoing studies assessed the ability of monkeys to link
objects with the value of outcomes. Although it is clear that
monkeys are making choices based on the value of the expected
outcome, namely, the value of the food that will be obtained by
choosing a particular object, there are some unresolved issues.
One major question surrounds the nature of the association
underlying the devaluation effects. Early work examined the
effects of reinforcer devaluation in the context of action-outcome
associations, as opposed to object-outcome associations. Indeed,
devaluation tasks have been theorized to interrogate knowledge
regarding the causal relationships between actions and the out-
comes to which they lead (Dickinson and Balleine, 1994). To
evaluate whether the neural circuitry underlying object-outcome
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associations in macaques would hold for action-outcome associ-
ations, we devised an action-outcome task for macaques and then
assessed the involvement of the amygdala and OFC on this new
task (Rhodes and Murray, 2013).
Although several studies have examined the role of frontal
cortex in the learning and performance of action-reward asso-
ciations in monkeys, they have often involved reversal learning
or matching tasks (Hadland et al., 2003; Kennerley et al., 2006;
Rudebeck et al., 2008; Chudasama et al., 2012). With one excep-
tion (Chudasama et al., 2012), no studies have applied a direct
test of whether behavior is influenced by the current value of the
goal, as in the case of a devaluation task. In the new task, monkeys
were required to make two different responses for two different
food rewards. The actions, “tap” and “hold,” were two mutually
exclusive responses performed via manual contact with a touch-
sensitive screen. A tap response consisted of six rapid touches to
the screen, all performed within 2 s, and a hold response consisted
of maintained contact with the screen for 2 s. Once the individual
actions were learned, monkeys were given a choice between per-
forming either the tap or the hold response on every trial to earn
the corresponding food reward.
As was the case for the object-based task, we evaluated each
monkey’s response preference after sating the monkey on one of
the two foods. In this procedure, monkeys were allowed to con-
sume one of the two foods to satiety and were then tested for
tap/hold preference under extinction. As shown in Figure 3, when
monkeys were tested for their willingness to perform actions asso-
ciated with either the higher-value (non-devalued) or lower-value
(devalued) food, unoperated controls performed significantly
more of the responses associated with the non-devalued food. As
predicted from results of studies with rats (Johnson et al., 2009),
and as was the case for the object-based studies described earlier,
bilateral selective, excitotoxic lesions of the amygdala disrupted
FIGURE 3 | Devaluation effects for action–outcome associations. After
selective satiation, unoperated control monkeys perform significantly more
of the responses associated with the higher value (non-devalued) food
relative to responses associated with the lower value (devalued) food. Thus,
controls show classic devaluation effects. Monkeys with either bilateral
excitotoxic lesions of the amygdala or bilateral excitotoxic lesions of the
OFC fail to show devaluation effects. ∗p < 0.05. Modified from Rhodes and
Murray (2013).
devaluation effects. Monkeys with amygdala lesions also made
significantly more omissions relative to controls; this accounts for
the overall lower number of responses in this group (Figure 3). In
addition, counter to findings in rats (Ostlund and Balleine, 2007),
bilateral, selective excitotoxic lesions of OFC likewise disrupted
devaluation effects (Rhodes and Murray, 2013). Taken together
with the data from object-based tasks, these results strongly
implicate both the amygdala and OFC in value-based decision
making.
DECISIONS BASED ON INTERNAL CONTEXT
Although we and others have interpreted these data in the frame-
work of value updating, an alternative possibility is that the
amygdala is critical for either representing internal context or
using internal context to guide behavior. On this view, amyg-
dala damage disrupts so-called devaluation effects because of its
influence on processing of internal context, which is needed for
the “value-updating” function. The devaluation task does not
allow us to discriminate between the two possible roles for the
amygdala. If the amygdala plays a general role in guiding choice
behavior with respect to internal context, then amygdala dam-
age should cause impairments in other situations where object
choices are based on internal context, and not just when the
choices are based on updating of the value of food associated with
the objects.
To test the contribution of the amygdala to object choices
based on internal context we trained monkeys on a discrimina-
tion whereby objects associated with food (but not water) were
baited when the monkey was hungry, and objects associated with
water (but not food) were baited when the monkey was thirsty.
To solve this task monkeys were required to choose objects yield-
ing the reward congruent with their internal motivational state.
As shown in Figure 4, lesions of the amygdala failed to disrupt
FIGURE 4 | Choices between objects associated with food vs. fluid
resources. On each trial, monkeys were allowed to choose among objects
associated with food or fluid reward and a third, nonreinforced object. Only
objects associated with food reward were baited when monkeys were
hungry, and only those objects associated with fluid were baited when
monkeys were thirsty. Curves show scores for sessions involving object
choices when monkeys were either hungry (food) or thirsty (fluid).
Amygdala lesions had no effect on learning rates in this task. Modified from
Rhodes et al. (2012).
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either learning or performance of this task (Rhodes et al., 2012).
Accordingly, it seems unlikely that the involvement of the amyg-
dala in devaluation tasks, which depends in part on a change in
internal context, is due to the amygdala playing a general role in
representing, or using, internal context.
WHEN DOES DEVALUATION OCCUR?
AMYGDALA
Given the results from selective excitotoxic lesions cited above,
the deficit on the devaluation task could result from a disrup-
tion in either or both of two mechanisms: (1) updating the value
of the food during selective satiation; or (2) linking objects with
the current value of a food to guide object choices. Using tempo-
rary inactivation techniques, Wellman and colleagues (2005) have
provided a significant advance in understanding the amygdala’s
contribution to devaluation effects. Monkeys were trained on
the devaluation task as described above. Wellman and colleagues
then infused the GABA agonist muscimol into the basolateral
amygdala, bilaterally, either before or after the selective satia-
tion procedure, thereby producing a temporary inactivation of
the basolateral amygdala. Finally, they administered the probes
tests in the usual manner. Importantly, infusions before selective
satiation would lead to inactivation during the selective satiation
procedure, which is when the value-updating process is thought
to occur, as well as during the probe tests, when object choices
are made. By contrast, infusions after the selective satiation pro-
cedure would affect amygdala activity only during the choice tests.
Wellman et al. found that temporary inactivation of the amygdala
during the selective satiation procedure, but not afterward, dis-
rupted the devaluation effects (Wellman et al., 2005). This finding
shows that the amygdala is essential specifically for the value-
updating process; once the new value is registered, the amygdala
is no longer needed.
OFC
As described above for the amygdala, to dissect the contributions
of OFC to different phases of the devaluation task, West and col-
leagues examined the effects of inactivation of OFC before and
after the selective satiation procedure (West et al., 2011). They
found that inactivation of OFC either before or after the selective
satiation procedure disrupted devaluation effects. In this exper-
imental design, the interpretation of the results is complicated
by the fact that, in both conditions, OFC is inactive during the
probe tests. Accordingly, there are two possible interpretations
of the pattern of results. One possibility is that OFC is essential
for both the value-updating function and the selection function.
Alternatively, however, it is possible that OFC is essential for only
the selection function. Some preliminary data from our labora-
tory may inform this debate. To explore the potential independent
contributions of areas 11 and 13 to devaluation effects, Howland
and colleagues (2011) examined the effects of transient inactiva-
tions of each of these regions separately onmonkeys’ performance
on the devaluation task. Inactivation of neurons in area 13 dur-
ing the selective satiation procedure disrupted devaluation effects;
by contrast, inactivation after selective satiation but before choice
tests had no effect (Howland et al., 2011). Inactivation of area 11
produced the converse result; inactivation of area 11 during the
selective satiation procedure had no effect whereas inactivation
after selective satiation disrupted devaluation effects. In separate
sessions, carried out as a control, inactivation of area 11 had
no effect on performance of familiar discrimination problems.
Accordingly, area 11 is not necessary for selection of objects gen-
erally, but only in conditions when a new value must be accessed.
These preliminary findings suggest that area 13 is essential for
encoding the change in reward value that occurs during selective
satiation but not for longer-term storage of that value. Area 11, by
contrast, appears to be essential for storage and/or retrieval of the
updated value but not for the value-updating function. Such dif-
ferential contributions of parts of OFC to value-updating may be
related to the relative strength of connections, either reciprocal or
non-reciprocal, with the amygdala across the OFC (Carmichael
and Price, 1995a; Ghashghaei et al., 2007). Thus, discrete subre-
gions of OFC may make selective contributions to the different
phases of the devaluation task.
In summary, recent work with reversible inactivation tech-
niques indicates that the basolateral amygdala and lateral OFC
have dissociable roles in mediating devaluation effects. The baso-
lateral amygdala is required for updating the value of a food
reward during feeding. Once that change has been registered,
the amygdala is no longer needed to guide adaptive choices. The
OFC appears to be important for two functions: (1) updating and
registering a change in value and (2) storing and/or retrieving
updated value to guide object choices. Future studies will need
to assess whether other subdivisions within OFC or other regions
of prefrontal cortex outside OFC might also contribute to the
storage and retrieval of updated values.
COMPARISON OF SATIETY MECHANISMS IN MONKEYS
AND HUMANS
A large body of work has revealed that the activity of neu-
rons in both the OFC and amygdala in monkeys is modu-
lated by appetitive rewards, such as fruit juice, and stimuli
that predict them (Niki and Watanabe, 1979; Sanghera et al.,
1979; Thorpe et al., 1983; Tremblay and Schultz, 1999; Sugase-
Miyamoto and Richmond, 2005; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad,
2006). More fine-grained experimental methods have allowed
researchers to show that these reward-related responses are not
simply related to the salience or attentional nature of such
rewards. Instead, neuronal firing rates within the OFC and amyg-
dala, as opposed to other parts of the brain such as the pre-
motor or parietal cortex, reflect subjective value (Roesch and
Olson, 2004; Paton et al., 2006; Morrison and Salzman, 2009;
Leathers and Olson, 2012). Notably, neurons in OFC signal
not only the value of received rewards, but also the value of
expected rewards. During cue presentation, for example, the
activity of neurons in OFC reflects the value of the reward pre-
dicted by that cue, largely independently of cue identity and
location of any upcoming response (Thorpe et al., 1983; Wallis
and Miller, 2003; Kennerley and Wallis, 2009; Luk and Wallis,
2013). Furthermore, in the context of a task in which visual
stimuli are paired with specific appetitive (fluid) or aversive (air
puff) outcomes through Pavlovian conditioning, neurons in OFC
signal expected outcomes with a shorter latency than do amyg-
dala neurons (Morrison and Salzman, 2011). Moreover, OFC
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neurons signal expected value largely independently of what-
ever alternative outcomes might be available at the same time
(Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2008). This reward expectancy sig-
nal may mediate, at least in part, the devaluation effects described
above.
Also relevant to devaluation, neurophysiological studies have
reported satiety-dependent changes in neuronal activity within
OFC (Critchley and Rolls, 1996; Bouret and Richmond, 2010).
Specifically, value responsive neurons in OFC exhibit reductions
in firing rate as monkeys become increasingly sated. It should
be noted, however, that satiety-dependent changes in firing rate
have also been reported in parts of the prefrontal cortex out-
side of those essential for devaluation, including Walker’s areas
14 and 12 (Rolls et al., 1989; Critchley and Rolls, 1996; Bouret
and Richmond, 2010).
A number of investigations have started to uncover the
neural substrates of satiety and devaluation effects in humans
(O’Doherty et al., 2000; Small et al., 2001; Gottfried et al.,
2003; Kringelbach et al., 2003). In the first study of its kind,
O’Doherty and colleagues scanned human volunteers while they
were presented with distinct visual stimuli paired with either
banana or vanilla odors. After this initial scanning session, vol-
unteers ate bananas until they were sated and then were scanned
again in the same stimulus-odor task (O’Doherty et al., 2000).
Mirroring the findings from macaque monkeys, parts of the OFC
showed decreased activation to banana odors following satiation.
Activation of OFC in response to the non-sated vanilla odor,
by contrast, was not altered. Decreased activation in OFC to
visual stimuli associated with sated foods has been reported for
different types of foods, such as chocolate or food-related liq-
uids, such as tomato juice (Small et al., 2001; Kringelbach et al.,
2003). An additional study by Gottfried and colleagues extended
these findings by showing that the neural circuitry involved in
devaluation in humans includes parts of both the OFC and the
amygdala (Gottfried et al., 2003). Again, this complements the
work in macaques (Baxter et al., 2000), which has revealed that
interaction between the OFC and amygdala is critical for the
ability to update the value of food outcomes. In summary, the
available work in humans is largely in agreement with the reports
from macaque monkeys. One avenue for future research in both
monkeys and humans will be to explore the role of different
parts of the OFC in representing and updating stimulus-value
associations.
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER
When evaluating what resources to forage for in their environ-
ment, how do primates make appropriate choices? Typically, the
first step involves visual sensory processing to identify objects
and foods in the environment. In macaques, this function is
carried out in the inferior temporal cortex “object analyzer”
pathway, which we take to include the multimodal perirhinal
cortex (Figure 5). At the same time, gustatory, olfactory, vis-
ceral and tactile information comes together in caudal, agranular
OFC (Pritchard et al., 1986; Morecraft et al., 1992; Barbas, 1993;
Carmichael et al., 1994; Carmichael and Price, 1995b), which
likely houses representations of the flavor, texture, and palata-
bility of foods. Next, both perirhinal cortex and agranular OFC
project to the granular OFC, where these two streams of sen-
sory information converge (Carmichael and Price, 1995a; Cavada
et al., 2000; Saleem et al., 2008); granular OFC appears to be
the earliest site in OFC where visual sensory information regard-
ing objects may be linked to the sensory properties of foods.
Finally, through interaction with the amygdala and medial MD
as well as parts of the hypothalamus, sensory information about
potential resources in the environment is ascribed value, based
on the current state of the animal. With information about
the identity and value of potential foods in their environment
at their disposal, monkeys can then decide which resources or
foods are worth pursuing. Of course the picture is more com-
plicated than this. We have provided a simplified picture of the
FIGURE 5 | A schematic of brain structures involved in devaluation.
Lateral (left) and medial (right) views of the macaque brain showing locations
of structures involved in devaluation. Visual information from the retina is
processed in primary visual cortex and then in a series of cortical fields
terminating in inferior temporal cortex. More rostral regions of inferior
temporal cortex, including the multimodal perirhinal cortex, represent more
complex conjunctions of features, such as objects. This visual information
signaling object identity is then combined with features from other sensory
modalities (e.g., gustatory, olfactory, visceral sensory inputs) in the granular
OFC. Through interaction of the amygdala with MD thalamus and granular
OFC, these sensory representations of objects and foods can be linked with
value, based on the current biological needs of the animal.
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brain structures and interactions between them that might take
place.
But how does the OFC–amygdala–MD thalamus circuit
influence action? To contribute to foraging, these structures
must affect the motor system directly or indirectly. Recent
neurophysiological evidence suggests how the OFC–amygdala–
MD circuit influences processing in visuomotor pathways that
plan movements, through a mechanism akin to top–down
attention and biased competition (Pastor-Bernier and Cisek,
2011). These influences are probably mediated by connec-
tions between OFC and ventral, medial and dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (Barbas and Pandya, 1989; Carmichael and Price,
1996), which contribute to multisynaptic pathways to dorsal
premotor areas, mainly via dorsal and dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (Takahara et al., 2012), and cingulate premotor areas,
mainly via medial prefrontal cortex. In addition, the amyg-
dala projects to premotor cortex directly (Avendano et al.,
1983; Morecraft et al., 2007). Thus, both OFC and the amyg-
dala are well-situated to influence the targets selected for
action.
CONCLUSIONS
Considered together, the research reviewed in this article leads
to several conclusions. One set of conclusions regards what
brain structures and what kinds of computations underlie for-
aging decisions based on updated outcome valuations. First,
the evidence points to functional interactions among at least
the OFC, the amygdala and the magnocellular or medial MD
thalamus as the neural substrates for reinforcer devaluation
based on selective satiation (Figure 5). Second, it indicates that
the key computations involve the establishment of conjunctive
representations between certain sensory features of reinforc-
ing outcomes—potentially through interaction with agranular
OFC—and an updated valuation of those features. Third, the
computations performed by these OFC–amygdala circuits do not
depend on whether the monkey makes a decision among objects
or a decision among actions. These results provide further sup-
port for the idea that the key computation involves establishing
a conjunction between certain sensory properties of the out-
come and their current biological value. Fourth, the devaluation
effect does not depend on reading out the internal state of the
animal per se. If it did, the amygdala would play a necessary
role in choosing between objects that will produce food when
hungry and fluid when thirsty. We found that this is not the
case.
A second set of conclusions concerns when the devaluation
computations occur. The key results come from studying neural
inactivation during the consumption of a given kind of food, as
opposed to inactivations afterward, when monkeys make these
decisions. First, amygdala function is necessary as the animal
consumes the food. Although we have no direct evidence on
a fine time scale, we suspect that each ingestion event causes
a small devaluation of a given food until it reaches a floor,
which is called selective satiation. Second, the lateral OFC needs
to function during both the consumption/satiation phase and
later, when the animals make their decisions. Third, preliminary
evidence suggests that different parts of the OFC perform spe-
cialized functions in this regard: the more rostral part, area
11, needs to function when the animal uses the updated con-
junctions to choose among objects; the more caudal part, area
13, like the amygdala, must perform its function as satiation
progresses.
From a larger perspective, we can appreciate that the selec-
tive satiation procedure provides more than a tool for classifying
behavior as “goal-directed” or “habits.” It provides a window
on the computations underlying the decisions that primates and
other animals need to make during natural foraging. No for-
aging decision would serve an animal’s needs if it failed to
take into account the animal’s current state. As a result, the
level of satiation or deprivation on a vast array of necessary
resources enters into the computation underlying all foraging
decisions.
How then, do we put these conclusions together with those
concerning the role of OFC in linking objects (or choices among
objects) with outcomes (Rudebeck et al., 2008; Noonan et al.,
2010; Walton et al., 2010; Rushworth et al., 2011)? Studies of
probabilistic reinforcement have revealed a role for OFC in a
kind of updating function that differs from the one empha-
sized in this article (Walton et al., 2010). That kind of updating
reflects changes in the likelihood of reward or contingency. As
the likelihood of reward changes over time, the lateral parts
of OFC update the representations of objects to reflect those
changes. Accordingly, we term this object-outcome updating. In
this article, we have stressed a different updating function,
also mediated by the lateral parts of OFC, which might be
termed outcome-value updating. Whereas the studies of proba-
bilistic reinforcement emphasize the conjunctive representations
of objects and outcomes, the studies using reinforcer devalu-
ation emphasized here involve conjunctive representations of
current biological value with a feature (or features) of those
outcomes. The object–outcome updating goes hand in hand
with the updating involved in representing the current bio-
logical value associated with features of an outcome. We view
these different kinds of updating as complementary; it is pos-
sible that they depend on different circuits or populations of
neurons that are present in the OFC (O’Neill and Schultz,
2010). For food resources, for example, object–outcome updat-
ing keeps current information about the likelihood of food in
the environment; the outcome–value updating speaks to the sen-
sory properties of the predicted outcome and incorporates the
animal’s current state into these representations, which reflects
its current biological needs. Both of these types of updating
are critical to a foraging animal: one relates to the external
world and the likelihood of food, the other to the animal’s
internal needs and desires. Efficiently and adaptively incorporat-
ing both to guide foraging will help an animal attain maximal
fitness.
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